AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM HANDBOOK

Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau (AAIIB), Mongolia

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Issued as the official operational handbook for AAIIB investigation personnel, assigned specialists, and supporting staff.

Approval and Authorization

Approved for issue as the official AAIIB operational handbook for aircraft accident and incident investigation. This edition supersedes prior uncontrolled or draft-format handbook copies and shall be used as the current controlled reference document.

Director and General Investigator	Signature: _____ Date: 2026. 01. 20
Senior Investigator	Signature: _____ Date: 2026. 01. 20.
Developed Investigator	Signature: _____ Date: 2026. 01. 20

Document Control

Version	Date	Description of Change	Approved By
1.0	04 May 2019	Initial issued handbook	Head of AAIIB
2.0	20 Apr 2022	Official controlled reissue; standardized formatting, numbering, header/footer, and front matter	Director and General Investigator
2.1	20 January 2026	Appendix A formally rewritten into ICAO-style operational checklists; appendices standardized	Director and General Investigator

Distribution. The electronic version maintained by AAIIB is the master controlled copy. Any printed copy is uncontrolled unless issued with a control number.

Review cycle. This handbook shall be reviewed at least once every three years, and earlier whenever Annex 13, related ICAO guidance, national legislation, organizational structure, or investigation practice requires amendment.

Related documents. This handbook should be read together with AAIIB enabling legislation, AAIIB internal directives, recurrent training manuals, occurrence notification arrangements, and templates approved by the Bureau.

Record of Revisions

Edition No.	Date of Revision	Affected Pages	Remarks/Purpose of Revision
1.	27 Mar 2015	All	Initial handbook issue
2.	01 Mar 2019	All	General revision
3.	20 January 2026	Appendix A	Amendment aligned with Annex 13 changes (July 2024)
4.			
5.			
6.			

Table of Contents

1. Purpose and Scope

This handbook establishes the standard internal procedures to be followed by the Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau (AAIIB) of Mongolia in the conduct of aircraft accident and incident investigations. It provides operational direction from the moment an occurrence is notified through deployment, evidence management, analysis, report production, safety recommendation follow-up and records management.

The handbook is designed to support implementation of the international Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, together with the associated guidance material contained in the Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (Doc 9756).

This handbook applies to accidents, serious incidents and other selected occurrences that AAIIB decides to investigate under national law or internal policy. It applies to AAIIB investigators, the Investigator-in-Charge (IIC), managers, technical specialists, accredited representatives hosted by Mongolia, advisers, recorders, photographers, and any support personnel assigned to an investigation. It also provides reference material for coordination with police, airport operators; air navigation services providers, rescue and firefighting services, forensic bodies, operators and manufacturers.

The handbook is not intended to replace technical manuals for specialized laboratory work, flight recorder downloading methods, metallurgical examination or forensic pathology. Where specialist technical procedures exist, those procedures should be used together with this handbook. When conflict appears between this handbook and a binding legal or regulatory requirement, the legal requirement prevails and the matter shall be escalated to the Director and General Investigator for resolution and amendment.

2. Legal and Policy Framework

AAIIB investigations shall be conducted under the authority granted by Mongolian law and in a manner consistent with Annex 13. The sole objective of the technical investigation is the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability. This principle shall be stated at the opening meeting of each investigation and reflected in all communications, reports and briefings. Annex 13 continues to frame the international role of the State of Occurrence and the participation rights of other States having a recognized interest in the investigation. ICAO's Accident Investigation Section confirms that Annex 13 contains the SARPs for aircraft accident and incident investigation, and ICAO's USOAP evaluates State capability to implement such SARPs effectively and consistently.

Annex 13 remains current in its 13th Edition, issued in July 2024 with a corrigendum dated 11 October 2024, and therefore current handbook text should be drafted against that edition and any subsequent national implementing instruments. ICAO's public AIG document page continues to identify Annex 13 and Doc 9756 as the core foundation material for State investigation authorities.

National legal references should be inserted in this section when the handbook is adopted formally. At minimum, the final approved AAIIB version should cite the instrument establishing the investigation authority; provisions granting access to sites, persons, records and wreckage; provisions protecting sensitive safety information; and provisions enabling publication of final reports and issuance of safety recommendations. If the exact article numbers are updated or reorganized, the document owner shall amend the handbook promptly so that it remains legally precise.

The Director is responsible for ensuring that the handbook remains aligned with current law and with the latest adopted ICAO material. The General Investigator is responsible for converting those legal and policy requirements into operating practice, checklists, forms and training. Where internal procedures are more detailed than Annex 13 or Doc 9756, those procedures are intended to improve consistency and are not to be interpreted as limiting the authority granted by law.

3. Independence, Objectives and Principles

All AAIIB personnel shall preserve the independence, objectivity and safety focus of the investigation. Investigators shall avoid statements or actions suggesting that the technical investigation exists to assign civil, criminal, administrative or disciplinary responsibility. Investigators may cooperate with judicial or regulatory bodies where required by law, but such cooperation must not compromise the independence of safety investigation activities or the protection of sensitive safety information.

The standard principles guiding every investigation are timely response; preservation of evidence; factual accuracy; disciplined record keeping; analytical rigor; respect for victims and survivors; controlled communication; and practical safety outcomes. Investigators shall document what is known, what remains uncertain, and what assumptions were used in analysis. Unsupported conclusions, premature attribution, and media speculation shall be avoided.

Where evidence may be perishable, investigators shall prioritize actions that protect the evidentiary record: securing recorders, preserving electronic data, photographing transient marks, obtaining weather and air traffic information, recording witness observations quickly, and controlling movement of wreckage. These priorities should be weighed against immediate hazards, rescue requirements, fire suppression, public safety and any judicial instructions that have legal priority.

The IIC shall ensure that all team members understand the investigation objectives, reporting lines, safety precautions, confidentiality obligations and documentation rules before operational activity begins. This initial briefing shall be recorded in the investigation file.

4. Organization, Roles and Responsibilities

The Director and General Investigator provides overall institutional authority, approves release of final reports, signs major external communications where required, and ensures sufficient resources for the investigation. The Director may appoint or confirm the IIC for major events and may designate additional management oversight for complex, high profile or multi-State investigations.

The Chief Investigator is responsible for operational control of the investigation program. Duties include occurrence review, recommending the level of investigation, proposing the IIC, assigning investigators and specialists, approving deployment, monitoring progress, conducting key quality reviews, and ensuring that investigation records are retained in accordance with policy.

The Investigator-in-Charge has overall responsibility for organization, conduct and control of the investigation. The IIC shall define the investigation strategy; establish group structures where needed; assign tasks; authorize evidence movements; approve interview plans; monitor timelines; validate analytical outputs; manage draft report preparation; coordinate with accredited representatives; and brief AAIIB leadership. No significant technical decision affecting the direction of the investigation shall be taken without the IIC's knowledge.

Group members and investigators are responsible for specific work streams such as operations, airworthiness, power plants, human factors, flight recorders, air traffic services, aerodromes, survival factors and organizational analysis. Each member shall maintain a work log, collect and preserve evidence methodically, document source material, and provide factual notes and analysis memoranda to the IIC in the format requested.

Specialists, advisers and contracted experts may support the investigation where highly technical or unusual issues arise. They act under the direction of the IIC and shall sign confidentiality and conflict-of-interest declarations before being given access to protected information. Administrative support personnel may assist with logistics, finance, travel, translation, document control and meeting organization, but they shall not alter technical content without the approval of the responsible investigator.

5. Readiness and Preparedness

AAIIB shall maintain readiness arrangements to enable prompt and orderly response to notifiable occurrences. These arrangements include a duty notification process, current contact directories, transport options, field kits, evidence supplies, recording devices, personal protective equipment, and scene marking materials, secure data storage solutions, laptop templates, witness forms, evidence tags and pre-approved coordination channels with police, rescue services, airport operators, air navigation service providers, and relevant ministries.

The Chief Investigator shall ensure that a current roster identifies duty officers, on-call investigators, likely IIC candidates, subject matter specialists and support personnel. Contact details shall be verified periodically. At least once each year, the Bureau should test the

notification chain and field readiness arrangements through exercises, tabletop drills or participation in response simulations.

Field kits should normally include: high-visibility clothing; gloves; eye protection; respirators when appropriate; lighting; batteries; cameras; GPS or mapping tools; notebooks; measuring tools; evidence bags and seals; tags; labels; markers; tape; clipboard forms; storage media; laptop or tablet; and any standard checklists adopted by the Bureau. For larger or remote events, arrangements should exist for transport by road or air, temporary communications equipment, scene shelter, additional photography support and cold weather or mountainous area supplies where relevant to Mongolia's operating environment.

Readiness is not only a logistics matter. The Bureau shall also maintain updated templates, reporting formats, letters to participating States, and a document-control structure so that investigators can begin organized work immediately. The investigation file numbering system, digital folder structure and evidence numbering convention must be understood before an actual occurrence takes place.

6. Occurrence Notification and Initial Classification

Occurrence notification may be received from an operator, aerodrome, and air navigation service provider, rescue body, regulator, police, military unit, media source or another State. The receiving officer shall record the time and source of the notification, the basic details of the event, immediate hazards, whether rescue operations are ongoing, and contact details for follow-up. The initial record should be made even if information is incomplete or uncertain.

After receiving the first notification, AAIIB shall conduct an initial classification sufficient to decide whether the occurrence appears to be an accident, a serious incident or another occurrence requiring review. This classification may change as more information becomes available. Initial classification should consider injury status, aircraft damage, operational circumstances, available evidence, public interest, possible recurrence risk, involvement of foreign interests and legal reporting obligations.

The duty officer shall notify the Chief Investigator immediately. For significant events, the Director should be informed immediately. If the event may involve another State with participation rights under Annex 13, preliminary notice shall be prepared for coordination as soon as essential facts are confirmed. Investigators must distinguish between the rapid action needed for operational response and the more careful verification required before external publication of details.

The handbook flow below illustrates the standard escalation logic from first notification to deployment decision.

Operational note. When initial information is incomplete, the Bureau should err on the side of preserving options: start a log, alert management, and protect perishable evidence before deciding to reduce the response.

7. Activation, Appointment of the IIC and Deployment

Once AAIIB decides to investigate, the Chief Investigator shall recommend an IIC and a deployment package. The appointment shall be documented in writing or in the investigation log if immediate written issuance is not practicable. The IIC shall receive authority to organize the investigation, assign tasks and communicate operational requirements on behalf of AAIIB subject to Bureau policy and Director Oversight.

The level of deployment should be based on occurrence severity, expected complexity, safety significance, weather, site accessibility, security conditions, number of aircraft involved, possibility of hazardous materials, need for specialized mapping or recorder recovery, likely participation by other States, and the condition of the wreckage. A limited remote-response mode may be used where a full field deployment is not justified, but a documented rationale shall be placed on file.

- Before departure, the IIC shall issue a short deployment brief identifying: known facts; objectives for the first operational period; personnel assigned; transport and accommodation arrangements; safety risks; site access issues; communication protocols; required equipment; and expected coordination partners. Team members shall confirm receipt and readiness. The IIC or duty administrator shall ensure that travel approvals, security clearances and customs support for equipment are addressed where needed.

On arrival, the IIC shall establish contact with the local authority controlling access to the site, confirm rescue status, check hazard conditions, and determine whether immediate preservation steps are required. A command post shall be designated for the investigation team with controlled access to documents, digital media and evidence logs. The chain of command between the IIC, deputy IIC if any, and group leads shall be communicated clearly.

8. On-Site Investigation Management

- Site management begins with safety. The IIC shall ensure that the team does not enter or operate at the site until principal hazards are understood. Hazards may include fire, fuel, oxygen systems, batteries, weapons, pressurized components, infectious or biological hazards, unstable wreckage, difficult terrain, weather exposure, floodwater, animals, electrical hazards, traffic, and crowds. Safety controls may require the support of firefighters, police, the operator, airport rescue services or technical specialists.

Once safety conditions permit, the team shall define the outer site boundary, debris field limits, and any protected inner area. Scene access control shall be coordinated with police or security personnel where required. A site map or sketch shall be opened as soon as practicable and photographic coverage should begin before any evidence is moved unless movement is essential for rescue, hazard control or protection from destruction.

On-scene documentation should proceed from general to specific. Investigators shall first record overall scene orientation, runway or terrain relationship, weather traces, impact path, major wreckage items and distribution pattern. They shall then document detailed evidence such as control positions, fracture features, instrument readings, switch positions, propeller or fan blade signatures, ground scars, fire patterns, cockpit and cabin condition, restraint use, occupant survivability features and marks suggesting systems status or pre-impact breakup. Each photograph set should be referenced in the scene log.

The IIC shall manage site activities in operational periods. For each period, objectives should be set, tasks assigned, progress checked, and evidence transfer decisions documented. At the end of each day, the team should hold a debrief to record what was done, what remains open, immediate analytical observations, evidence security status, and the plan for the next period. This discipline greatly strengthens later auditability and report quality.

9. Evidence, Documentation and Chain of Custody

Every item of evidence that may later support factual findings or analysis shall be uniquely identified and recorded. This includes physical wreckage items, components, paper records, digital files, photographs, ATC recordings, surveillance data, weather products, maintenance records, crew documents, operational manuals, charts, and downloaded data. The method of identification should be standardized across the Bureau. A recommended convention is occurrence number – group code – sequential item number.

The evidence log shall capture at least: item number; short description; exact or approximate location found; date and time; person collecting the item; current storage status; transfers made; and remarks concerning condition, packaging or examination needs. Items susceptible to contamination, corrosion or data loss should be packaged and stored appropriately. If an item is left in place because it forms part of controlled wreckage, that status shall also be logged.

Chain of custody is especially important for recorders, electronic devices, documents, removable components, toxicology samples, and any item likely to be requested by another authority. Transfers shall identify both the releasing and receiving person, the date and time, the purpose of transfer, and any seals applied or broken. The Bureau's standard chain-of-custody form shall be used whenever custody changes physically or institutionally.

Digital evidence requires the same discipline as physical evidence. Investigators should preserve original files in secure read-only or access-controlled storage where practicable; create verified working copies for analysis, and document metadata and source. Screenshots or copies without provenance are not a substitute for obtaining original digital records when those records are available.

When evidence is moved for safety, rescue or wreckage recovery before investigators can document it fully, the person ordering or conducting the move should be identified and the reasons recorded. This prevents later confusion and helps preserve analytical confidence.

10. Flight Recorders, Documents and Specialist Examinations

Flight recorders, image recorders, portable electronic devices, avionics memory units and any electronic sources relevant to the occurrence should be identified and secured as soon as possible. Because data can be lost through fire, impact damage, water, improper handling or continued power supply, urgency is required. Recorders should be handled using approved methods, protected from further damage, and transferred under documented chain of custody to an approved download or readout facility.

The IIC shall decide whether recorder work will be conducted domestically or through another State or approved facility. The decision should account for capability, timeliness, participation rights of other States, and data protection arrangements. The readout process should be witnessed where appropriate by participating States or authorized representatives, and a clear record should be maintained of device serial numbers, condition on receipt, download steps, files produced and the identity of personnel involved.

Documentary evidence such as load sheets, maintenance records, and deferred defect logs, pilot training records, dispatch packages, meteorological information, radar tracks, ATC transcripts, NOTAMs and airport inspection records shall be requested promptly because retention periods vary. Requests should be made in writing where practicable, but urgent verbal requests are acceptable if followed promptly by written confirmation.

Where specialist examination is needed, the IIC shall establish terms of reference defining the questions to be answered, the items examined, test conditions, required participants, documentation standards and reporting deadlines. Examples include metallurgical fracture analysis, engine teardown, avionics bench tests, human performance analysis, fuel contamination testing, and pathology or toxicology support. Specialists shall provide factual descriptions of methods and findings; interpretive conclusions should be integrated into the wider investigation under IIC control.

11. Witnesses, Survivors and Coordination with Other Agencies

Witness and survivor evidence should be obtained respectfully, promptly and methodically. Investigators should distinguish between factual observations, impressions, assumptions and post-event discussion. Whenever possible, witness statements should be taken individually before collective discussion shapes memory. The standard witness interview form should be used, but investigators should allow witnesses to describe the sequence in their own words before moving to clarifying questions.

Interviews shall cover identity, location of the witness, lighting and visibility, what was seen, heard or smelled, timing references, observed aircraft attitude or trajectory, sounds, smoke or fire, emergency response, and any relevant prior knowledge of the flight. Investigators

should avoid leading questions and should not suggest conclusions. If translation is required, the interpreter's identity shall be recorded.

Coordination with police, prosecutors, emergency services, airport authorities and civil aviation regulators shall be practical and respectful. Investigators should explain the safety purpose of the technical investigation; clarify information-sharing arrangements, and document access restrictions or decisions affecting evidence. If another authority has legal custody of parts of the site or certain records, the IIC shall work through agreed liaison channels and record all requests and responses.

Family assistance, media issues and public information are not the primary focus of this handbook, but the IIC shall ensure that the investigation does not disrupt lawful family assistance arrangements and that no protected safety information is released casually. Public briefings, where necessary, should be factual, coordinated with Bureau leadership and carefully limited to confirmed information.

12. Analysis, Findings and Safety Recommendations

Analysis begins only after the factual record has been organized sufficiently to support disciplined reasoning. Investigators shall distinguish clearly between information, analysis, findings, contributing factors, underlying organizational issues and safety recommendations. The analysis should test alternative hypotheses, identify evidence supporting or weakening each hypothesis, and document unresolved uncertainties.

Analytical work should normally consider operational, technical, human, organizational and environmental dimensions. The team should ask not only what happened, but also why available barriers failed or were insufficient. Human performance issues should be treated within their operational and organizational context rather than as shorthand blame labels. Maintenance, design, supervision, training, documentation, air traffic, aerodrome, weather and regulatory influences should be examined where relevant to the sequence.

Findings should be written as concise statements grounded in evidence. Safety recommendations should flow logically from the identified safety issues and should be practical, clearly directed and risk-based. Recommendations are not punitive tools; they are preventive actions intended to reduce recurrence or mitigate consequences. Where immediate safety action is required before final report completion, AAIIB may issue urgent safety recommendations or safety advisories consistent with law and Bureau policy.

The IIC shall ensure that analytical notes and drafts are version-controlled. Where substantial disagreement exists within the team, the issue should be documented and resolved through structured review rather than informal deletion. This protects the integrity of the process and supports later audit or management review.

13. Drafting, Consultation, Approval and Publication of Reports

Report drafting should begin early, with the factual record section built progressively as evidence becomes stable. This avoids last-minute assembly and helps investigators identify information gaps while the inquiry is still active. The standard report structure should contain at least information, analysis, conclusions or findings, and safety recommendations where applicable.

The IIC shall manage report development through controlled drafts. Each draft should show date, version and distribution limitations. Technical sections should be reviewed by responsible investigators and then consolidated for internal quality review. AAIIB leadership should focus on whether the draft is clear, evidence-based, consistent with policy, free from unnecessary opinion, and suitable for consultation with participating States or affected parties where required by applicable procedures.

Before publication, the Bureau shall complete all required internal approvals, consultation steps and records checks. Sensitive information that is protected by law or policy shall be handled appropriately. Once the final report is approved, the publication method, recipient list and archive copy shall be recorded. Safety recommendations shall be tracked separately so that follow-up status can be monitored.

Doc 9756 continues to identify reporting as a major component of the investigation system and ICAO maintains the current third edition of Doc 9756 Part IV — reporting as guidance material for States.

14. Records, Protection of Information and Release of Wreckage

Each investigation shall have a master file containing occurrence notifications, appointment records, scene logs, evidence logs, photo indexes, interview notes, correspondence, laboratory reports, analytical memoranda, draft reports, review comments, approvals and publication records. Electronic and hard copy records shall be organized so that a competent reviewer can reconstruct the sequence of investigative actions without relying on memory.

Protected safety information shall be handled according to law, Annex 13 principles, and AAIIB policy. Access shall be limited to those with a defined need. Uncontrolled duplication, personal storage, informal messaging of sensitive material and unlogged data transfers shall be avoided. Investigators leaving the Bureau or the investigation team shall return all controlled materials and confirm disposal or transfer of working copies as directed.

Wreckage or components shall not be released until AAIIB is satisfied that examination needs have been completed or otherwise preserved, and that release will not prejudice further analysis. Any partial release shall identify what is being released, to whom, under what conditions, and whether AAIIB retains a right of future access. The IIC or higher authority depending on the significance of the item should authorize the release decision.

When the investigation closes, the file shall be archived in accordance with AAIIB record retention rules. The closing record should indicate final report status, recommendation status, evidence disposition and any lessons learned that require amendment of this handbook or other internal procedures.

15. International Coordination

When an occurrence involves rights of participation for another State, AAIIB shall communicate promptly through the channels authorized by law and Annex 13. This may include the State of Registry, State of the Operator, State of Design, State of Manufacture and any State that provided information, facilities or experts relevant to the investigation. The IIC shall maintain a log of invitations, acknowledgements, participant names, advisers and meetings.

Accredited representatives and their advisers shall be briefed on site access, safety rules, evidence handling, information release restrictions, and the internal structure of the investigation. Participation shall be managed to preserve orderly conduct and clear accountability. Differences of view should be documented professionally and considered during analysis and report consultation.

If specialized capability is needed from another State or organization, such as recorder readout or engineering support, the IIC shall define the scope of assistance carefully and ensure that results are returned into the controlled record. Cooperation should strengthen the investigation without displacing AAIIB's responsibility for the final technical conclusions.

International coordination is often scrutinized during audits because it demonstrates whether the State can implement Annex 13 participation provisions in practice. Investigators should therefore keep correspondence and meeting records complete and orderly.

16. Quality Assurance, Internal Review and Lessons Learned

Every major investigation should include planned internal quality checks. These checks should verify that logs are complete, evidence is traceable, analytical reasoning is supported, recommendations are logically linked to safety issues, and report language is clear and non-punitive. Quality review is not intended to slow the investigation; it is intended to strengthen it and reduce the risk of later inconsistency.

The Chief Investigator should schedule at least one formal internal review point during the field phase for significant events and one structured review during report drafting. Review findings should be recorded and closed out. Where a review identifies a gap in procedure, training or equipment, the matter shall be entered into a lessons-learned register for management action.

After final report issuance, the IIC shall conduct a closeout session to capture lessons regarding deployment, coordination, evidence management, analysis, report preparation and logistics. Recurrent themes should drive handbook amendments, checklists revisions, and procurement changes or targeted training. A handbook is audit-ready only when it is demonstrably used and improved through operational experience.

Appendix A — ICAO-Style Operational Checklists

This appendix replaces the legacy EVENT 1–66 sequence with a formal, phase-based operational checklist system. The content is derived from the existing AAIIB EVENT structure, but is reorganized into ICAO-style procedures that are easier to deploy, supervise, audit, and revise.

A.0 Crosswalk from Legacy EVENT System

Formal Checklist Section	Legacy EVENT Coverage	Primary Responsible Leads
A.1 Notification, Activation and Mobilization	Events 1–2	Duty Officer, Chief Investigator, IIC
A.2 Site Security, Scene Control and Initial Survey	Events 2, 15–16	IIC, Site Survey, Photo/Video
A.3 Documentary Evidence Collection — Operations and Cabin	Events 3, 10, 17, 24	OPS Documentation, Cabin Safety
A.4 Documentary Evidence Collection — Maintenance and Airworthiness	Events 11, 25, 48	AW Documentation, Maintenance/Records
A.5 Medical, Human Remains and Human Factors Coordination	Events 4, 18, 32, 33, 43, 51	Medical/HF, OPS
A.6 Witness Development and Interview Management	Events 5, 31, 35, 36, 39, 40, 44, 47, 52	OPS, HF, ATS, AW
A.7 Flight Recorder Recovery, Readout and Data Integration	Events 6, 20, 34, 53	Flight Recorder Group, IIC
A.8 Weather, ATS, Airport and Navigation Data	Events 7, 8, 21, 22, 45, 54, 55	MET, ATS/Aerodrome
A.9 Search, Rescue, Firefighting, Evacuation and Survival Factors	Events 9, 23, 37, 46, 56	SAR, Survival Factors, Cabin Safety
A.10 Systems Examination and Testing	Events 12, 26, 59	Systems Group
A.11 Structures, Fire, Crashworthiness and Reconstruction	Events 13, 27, 41, 49, 60	Structures Group
A.12 Powerplants, Engines and Propellers	Events 14, 28, 61	Powerplant Group
A.13 Site Mapping, Wreckage Plotting and Visual Documentation	Events 15, 16, 29, 30, 62, 63	Site Survey, Photo/Video
A.14 Operational and Technical Analysis	Events 42, 50, 64, 65	IIC, OPS and Technical Groups
A.15 Final Report Development and Approval	Event 66	Chief Investigator, IIC

A.1 Notification, Activation and Mobilization

Purpose. To capture complete initial notification data, decide whether an occurrence requires investigation, appoint the Investigator-in-Charge, and mobilize the investigation team without delay or loss of perishable evidence.

Procedure

1. Receive notification from any available source, including operator, aerodrome, ATS unit, emergency service, regulator, police, military source, other State, or credible public report.
2. Open an occurrence log immediately and record time received, source, aircraft identity, operator, location, injuries, apparent damage, immediate hazards, and status of rescue activity.
3. Contact local police, airport authority, ATS, and operator as required to verify essential facts and preserve the site from disturbance pending investigation direction.
4. Determine whether dangerous goods, hazardous materials, explosives, weapons, biological hazards, or other special risks may be involved.
5. Notify the Chief Investigator immediately. For significant events, notify the Director and General Investigator without delay.
6. Make the preliminary occurrence classification: accident, serious incident, or occurrence for review. If uncertainty exists, preserve investigative options and prepare for possible deployment.
7. Identify the likely team composition, including IIC, operations, airworthiness, recorder, human factors, medical, ATS/aerodrome, and specialist support as appropriate.
8. Issue the appointment of the IIC and record the deployment rationale, objectives, and level of response.
9. Complete required notifications to States entitled to participate under Annex 13 and, where applicable, ICAO notification channels in accordance with AAIIB procedures.
10. Arrange travel, access credentials, communications, maps, accommodation, equipment issue, first-aid resources, and cold-weather or remote-site provisions where required by location and season.

A.2 Site Security, Scene Control and Initial Survey

Purpose. To secure the occurrence site, establish investigative control, and create a documented baseline before evidence is moved or degraded.

Procedure

11. Confirm with police, airport security, or local authority what protective actions are already in place and adjust the site perimeter as necessary.
12. Establish the investigation command post and define access rules for the outer perimeter, controlled work area, and protected evidence zone.

13. Obtain a full briefing from local authorities and responders covering rescue actions, firefighting, wreckage movement, casualties, weather, access routes, and known hazards.
14. Conduct a structured preliminary site survey with the investigation team before detailed recovery activity begins.
15. Define the debris field limits, identify the probable impact sequence, mark critical components, and record areas requiring immediate photography or evidence protection.
16. Ensure photographic overview coverage and scene sketching begin before any avoidable movement of wreckage or evidence.
17. Record decisions authorizing any movement required for rescue, safety, fire suppression, or hazard mitigation, including who directed the action and why.

A.3 Documentary Evidence Collection — Operations and Cabin

Purpose. To secure all operations, dispatch, crew, and cabin-related records that may support reconstruction of the flight, the operator's control environment, and passenger/cabin safety issues.

Procedure

18. Obtain and secure the Air Operator Certificate, operations manual, SOPs, flight manuals, cockpit checklists, dispatch materials, route manuals, schedules, load sheet, mass and balance documentation, passenger and freight manifests, refuelling records, and pertinent communications records.
19. Secure pilot and cabin crew qualification records, medical validity, training history, line checks, duty rosters, flight logs, and recent flying schedules.
20. Collect cabin safety materials, including cabin crew manuals, emergency procedures, passenger safety briefing cards or videos, seating and cabin configuration data, galley information, and cabin-related deferred defects or snags.
21. Request equivalent oversight records from the civil aviation authority, including licensing, inspection history, audit results, approved manuals, and relevant policy letters.
22. Preserve all source documents in original or certified form and log them into the evidence system with document provenance clearly identified.
23. Review the records chronologically to establish crew history, operator oversight context, dispatch decisions, and any known operational irregularities.

A.4 Documentary Evidence Collection — Maintenance and Airworthiness

Purpose. To secure all technical, maintenance, reliability, and certification records necessary to determine airworthiness status and technical history.

Procedure

24. Obtain and secure the certificate of airworthiness, certificate of registration, journey log, technical log, maintenance control manual, maintenance release records, airframe, engine and propeller logbooks, and pre-flight servicing documentation.

25. Collect records of repairs, alterations, deferred defects, recurring snags, airworthiness directives, major maintenance, subcontracted maintenance, ETOPS-related requirements where relevant, and flight recorder maintenance history.
26. Obtain operator quality assurance, standards, procedures, personnel and training records relevant to maintenance performance and supervision.
27. Request civil aviation authority records covering aircraft file history, maintenance reliability reports, system difficulty reporting, mandatory occurrence reporting, and approved MMEL information.
28. Compile a chronological history of the aircraft, airframe, engines, propellers, and major systems, identifying modifications, outstanding defects, and maintenance events with potential relevance to the occurrence.
29. Log all records in the master evidence file and assign follow-up actions where discrepancies, gaps, or anomalies are identified.

A.5 Medical, Human Remains and Human Factors Coordination

Purpose. To coordinate the medical and human factors aspects of the investigation while preserving dignity, legality, and evidentiary integrity.

Procedure

30. Coordinate with police, coroner, forensic authority, or medical examiner concerning access, victim recovery, identification, autopsy requirements, and preservation of medical evidence.
31. Determine the personnel, vehicles, morgue facilities, and specialist support required for human remains recovery and documentation.
32. Photograph and plot the location of remains where lawful and necessary for survivability or sequence analysis, ensuring dignity and controlled access.
33. Obtain crew medical examinations where feasible and lawful, including blood and urine samples, medical status, medication history, personal history, and pre-flight activities relevant to human performance.
34. Request autopsy and toxicology examinations for flight crew, cabin crew, and passengers where needed to assess pre-impact impairment, survivability, fire or smoke exposure, restraint effectiveness, and injury mechanisms.
35. Interview next of kin, when appropriate and sensitively managed, to gather background information on fatigue, medical status, medication use, personal habits, or psychological stressors relevant to the investigation.
36. Integrate medical, human performance, and survivability information into the controlled investigation record without disclosing protected information unnecessarily.

A.6 Witness Development and Interview Management

Purpose. To obtain complete, reliable witness evidence while minimizing memory contamination and ensuring procedural consistency across groups.

Procedure

37. Identify eyewitnesses, first responders, flight crew, cabin crew, ATS personnel, weather personnel, maintenance personnel, airport personnel, and other informed parties as early as possible.
38. Conduct interviews individually and, where feasible, at the witness observation point to document line of sight, hearing conditions, timing references, and environmental context.
39. Collect witness contact details, photographs, video, and other privately held material relevant to the occurrence.
40. Use a structured interview plan that distinguishes observed facts from assumptions, opinions, and later discussion or media influence.
41. Prepare specialist question sets for operations, ATS, weather, airworthiness, maintenance, cabin safety, and powerplant issues as necessary.
42. Maintain interview records, summaries, and credibility notes. Where witness volume is high, prepare matrices showing consistency, conflict, and unresolved issues.
43. Plan and conduct re-interviews where the analysis requires clarification or where new evidence materially changes the investigative context.

A.7 Flight Recorder Recovery, Readout and Data Integration

Purpose. To recover, preserve, read out, and integrate flight recorder and digital data in a controlled and technically defensible manner.

Procedure

44. Locate CVR, FDR, image recorders, avionics memory units, portable devices, and other digital recording sources as priority evidence items.
45. Photograph each item in situ, record its position and apparent condition, and recover it using approved methods designed to prevent further damage or data loss.
46. Prepare packaging and secure transport arrangements, ensuring chain of custody is maintained throughout recovery and transfer.
47. Decide the most appropriate readout facility based on capability, timeliness, participation rights of other States, and data protection arrangements.
48. Document serial numbers, calibration information, condition on receipt, personnel present, download steps, files generated, and storage references for all recorder activity.
49. Prepare initial summaries, transcripts, plots, and synchronized timelines for the IIC and designated groups, then refine the outputs using cross-checks from other evidence streams.
50. Incorporate recorder data into the operational, technical, and flight path reconstruction process and preserve both original data and verified working copies.

A.8 Weather, ATS, Airport and Navigation Data

Purpose. To secure the complete external operating environment record surrounding the flight, including meteorology, ATS, aerodrome status, and navigation aid performance.

Procedure

51. Determine how and from whom the flight crew obtained weather briefing information; interview the briefer or responsible weather unit where appropriate.
52. Secure METAR, TAF, SIGMET, special weather observations, radar and satellite imagery, upper air data, PIREPs, RVR records, surface observations, wind records, sunrise/sunset data, and other relevant meteorological products.
53. Collect the flight plan, flight plan messages, departure messages, NOTAMs, ATS tapes, controller strips, radar recordings, unit logs, outage reports, station logs, and names of duty ATS personnel.
54. Collect airport records, including certification information, braking action reports, equipment inspections, airport manager logs, runway and taxiway status, lighting status, and rescue and firefighting readiness.
55. Obtain navigation and approach charts and request technical checks of navigation aids where serviceability may be relevant.
56. Review and summarize meteorological hazards, controller actions, airport conditions, and the operational environment, identifying any areas requiring specialist testing or follow-up interview.

A.9 Search, Rescue, Firefighting, Evacuation and Survival Factors

Purpose. To evaluate the emergency response sequence, occupant evacuation, and survivability performance from impact to rescue completion.

Procedure

57. Document how and when search and rescue operations were initiated, which agencies participated, the methods used, environmental conditions, and the time the site was located.
58. Assess whether published search procedures were followed and whether the response was adequate for the circumstances.
59. Document alerting, dispatch, equipment, staffing, routes, communications, difficulties, arrival times, and completion times for rescue and firefighting operations.

60. Record pre-impact safety briefings, emergency instructions, use of exits and emergency equipment, crew management of passengers, evacuation timing, and passenger assistance behaviour.
61. Evaluate emergency equipment performance, including lighting, extinguishers, detectors, megaphones, oxygen equipment, smoke protection, flashlights, first-aid kits, rafts, lifejackets, and other survivability equipment as applicable.
62. Assess the adequacy of exit design, signage, emergency instructions, walkways, access, and passenger or crew factors affecting escape and survivability.
63. Coordinate this work with structures, cabin safety, human factors, and medical groups to establish the relationship between impact environment, post-impact conditions, and survival outcome.

A.10 Systems Examination and Testing

Purpose. To examine the aircraft has installed systems systematically, preserve evidence of failure, and direct further laboratory or bench testing where required.

Procedure

64. Identify and locate all relevant systems and components, including flight controls, hydraulics, pneumatics, electrical systems, avionics, instruments, fuel, ice/rain protection, landing gear, fire protection, pressurization, oxygen, and thrust reversers.
65. Record system selections, positions, indications, switch states, circuit protection status, and visible damage before deactivation or removal.
66. Photograph all suspect components and preserve electronic memory or volatile data from computers and avionics where relevant.
67. Deactivate hazardous systems safely and document the method used.
68. Select components for detailed examination and testing based on observed damage, witness reports, recorder data, or operational anomalies.
69. Prepare formal statements of requirements for examination and testing and ensure investigators are present or represented during specialist work.

A.11 Structures, Fire, Crashworthiness and Reconstruction

Purpose. To determine the role of structural integrity, fire, crashworthiness, and wreckage reconstruction in the occurrence sequence and its consequences.

Procedure

70. Conduct an overall examination of the airframe and flight control surfaces to determine pre-impact integrity and accident-related damage.
71. Assess the need for detailed testing, reconstruction, fracture analysis, or specialist engineering support.

72. Document and analyze fire or explosion evidence, including burn patterns, soot, pitting, fragmentation, likely ignition sources, and whether the signatures indicate in-flight or post-impact fire.
73. Assess crashworthiness and survivability issues, including livable space, occupant flail paths, restraint performance, seat and floor integrity, cargo restraint, exit access, and energy absorption characteristics.
74. Record impact geometry, gouge marks, ground scars, stopping distances, deformation patterns, and other physical indicators needed to estimate impact forces and occupant survivability.
75. Where reconstruction is required, select a suitable area, define the reconstruction method, provide resources, photograph all phases, and identify additional evidence requiring test or interview follow-up.

A.12 Power plants, Engines and Propellers

Purpose. To determine the pre-impact condition and operating status of engines, propellers, and associated control systems.

Procedure

76. Locate engines and propellers and confirm make, model, and serial numbers.
77. Record position, condition, continuity, and pre-impact integrity of engines, propellers, controls, instruments, and auxiliary systems.
78. Obtain fuel and oil samples and preserve them for laboratory analysis where appropriate.
79. Assess the evidence relating to power being developed at impact, including physical signatures, instrument indications, and recorder data.
80. Select components for teardown, specialist examination, and test work, and ensure investigation attendance or observation during those processes.
81. Integrate powerplant evidence with operations, systems, and flight recorder analysis to determine its significance in the occurrence.

A.13 Site Mapping, Wreckage Plotting and Visual Documentation

Purpose. To produce an accurate visual and spatial record of the occurrence site and any subsequent recovery, reconstruction, or component examination activity.

Procedure

82. Define the probable distribution of wreckage and identify the materials, personnel, and search methods required for debris location and marking.
83. Plot major components, initial impact point, impact direction, debris path, witness locations, fire areas, ground scars, and other significant terrain or infrastructure features.
84. Establish photographic priorities for general scene coverage, perishable evidence, hazardous systems, recorders in situ, cockpit and cabin details, structural signatures, ATS view lines, and suspect components.

85. Coordinate specific photography requests from operations, systems, structures, human factors, ATS/aerodrome, and powerplant groups.
86. Photograph wreckage recovery operations, reconstruction, teardown, specialist testing, and other post-site work as required to maintain a continuous visual record.
87. Ensure all photos and videos are indexed, time-referenced where possible, and linked to scene logs, evidence items, and investigative questions.

A.14 Operational and Technical Analysis

Purpose. To consolidate evidence from all groups, resolve conflicts, identify safety issues, and produce defensible findings and recommendations.

Procedure

88. Complete group-level reviews of operations, human factors, witnesses, flight recorders, weather, ATS/aerodrome, survivability, cabin safety, maintenance, systems, structures, powerplants, site survey, and photo/video evidence.
89. For each group, review all collected information, assess reliability and consistency, identify gaps, and submit a written report to the Chief Investigator or IIC as directed.
90. Conduct integrated operations analysis meetings and technical analysis meetings chaired by the Chief Investigator or IIC with all relevant group leads.
91. Identify conflicts, inconsistencies, unresolved questions, and additional investigative actions required before findings are finalized.
92. Determine the causal and contributing sequence using factual evidence, analytical reasoning, and cross-group validation.
93. Identify safety hazards, systemic deficiencies, and practical, evidence-based safety recommendations.

A.15 Final Report Development and Approval

Purpose. To assemble the final technical report in a controlled manner that meets AAIIB policy and Annex 13 reporting requirements.

Procedure

94. Organize the report narrative, assemble factual information, and integrate validated findings from all groups.
95. Ensure that facts, analysis, conclusions, and safety recommendations are clearly distinguished and evidence-based.
96. Attach appendices, supporting graphics, and approved technical materials as required for clarity and traceability.
97. Incorporate late-arriving information only through controlled version management and with clear identification of changes.

98. Submit the draft report for internal review, consultation, and approval in accordance with Bureau procedures.
99. Revise the report as directed by the approving authority and submit the final version for formal issue and publication.

Appendix B — Standard Forms

The following forms are standardized for controlled use within AAIIB investigations. They preserve the intent of the existing handbook while adopting a more formal structure and field discipline.

B.1 Occurrence Notification Form

Field	Entry
Occurrence number	
Date/time received	
Source of notification	
Notifying person and organization	
Contact details	
Aircraft type/model/registration	
Operator/owner	
Location and coordinates	
Date/time of occurrence	
Departure / intended destination	
Crew / passengers onboard	
Fatal / serious injury information	
Preliminary classification	
Immediate hazards / dangerous goods	
Duty officer remarks and escalation	

B.2 Appointment and Deployment Record

Field	Entry
Occurrence number	
Appointed IIC	
Team members	
Date/time of appointment	
Deployment level and rationale	
Initial objectives	
Safety concerns	
Approved by	

B.3 Evidence Log

Field	Entry
Item number	
Description	
Location found	
Collected by	
Date/time	

Current status	
Remarks	

B.4 Chain of Custody Form

Field	Entry
Item number	
Released by	
Received by	
Date/time	
Purpose of transfer	
Seal/condition	

B.5 Witness Interview Record

Field	Entry
Witness name	
Contact details	
Interview date/time	
Location at time of occurrence	
Language/interpreter	
Free narrative statement	
Clarifying questions and answers	
Investigator observations	
Witness signature / investigator signature	

B.6 Recorder Recovery and Readout Control Form

Field	Entry
Occurrence number	
Recorder/device type and serial number	
Condition when found	
Recovery location and time	
Packaging and transfer details	
Readout facility / participants	
Files produced and storage reference	
Investigator remarks	

B.7 Investigation Analysis Worksheet

Field	Entry
Issue / question	
Evidence supporting	
Evidence weakening	
Action / next step	

B.8 Safety Recommendation Tracking Sheet

Field	Entry
Recommendation ID	
Safety issue	
Addressee	
Status	
Remarks	

B.9 Report Internal Review Checklist

Field	Entry
Facts traceable to file	
Analysis distinguishes fact from inference	
Findings supported by evidence	
Recommendations linked to safety issues	
Protected information handled correctly	
Version control and approvals complete	

Appendix C — Investigation Group Templates

Each group report shall contain the sections listed below and shall cite evidence item numbers, document references, interview references, and recorder references wherever applicable.

C.1 Operations Group Report

Flight history; crew qualifications; dispatch and operational control; SOP compliance; aircraft performance factors; operational analysis; findings; safety issues.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.2 Airworthiness and Maintenance Group Report

Technical status; maintenance history; deferred defects; compliance status; reliability issues; maintenance management observations; findings; safety issues.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.3 Systems Group Report

System configuration; pre-impact serviceability; examinations and tests; failure analysis; findings; safety issues.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information

- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.4 Structures and Crashworthiness Group Report

Airframe integrity; fire/explosion evidence; crashworthiness; reconstruction; survivability mechanics; findings; safety issues.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.5 Powerplants Group Report

Engine and propeller condition; samples and testing; operating status; teardown findings; safety issues.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.6 Flight Recorders Group Report

Recovery, chain of custody, readout process, data quality, transcript/plot development, timeline reconstruction, findings.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.7 Human Factors / Medical Group Report

Medical and toxicology results; fatigue, workload, decision-making, survivability and restraint issues; findings.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.8 Meteorology Group Report

Meteorological products collected; weather briefing chain; hazardous weather analysis; findings.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.9 ATS and Aerodrome Group Report

ATC communications and radar; airport status; navigation aid condition; personnel and procedures; findings.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.10 Survival Factors and Cabin Safety Group Report

Emergency response; evacuation; cabin condition; emergency equipment; survivability; findings.

- Scope and objective

- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.11 Site Survey and Photo/Video Group Report

Debris distribution; mapping; imagery index; visual interpretation; support to other groups; findings.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

C.12 Integrated Analysis and Final Report Template

Consolidated factual record; cross-group analysis; conclusions; safety recommendations; publication and follow-up log.

- Scope and objective
- Activities conducted
- Sources of information
- Factual information
- Analysis
- Findings
- Safety issues identified
- Supporting evidence references

Aircraft Accident Investigation Management Forms

FORM 1 — Notification and Activation

Investigator-in-Charge (IIC):

Date/Time (UTC/Local):

Source of Information:

Occurrence Details

- Operator:
- Aircraft Type / Registration:
- Location:
- Date & Time:
- Flight Type / Route:
- Persons on Board:
- Fatalities / Injuries:
- Damage:
- Dangerous Goods:

2. Actions Taken

- Authorities notified:
- ICAO / States notified:
- Investigation team appointed:
- Logistics arranged (travel, accommodation, equipment):

3. Remarks

FORM 2 — Site Security and Hazard Control

Lead Investigator:

Date/Time:

Site Security

- Secured by:
- Perimeter established:
- Access control measures:

2. Hazard Identification

- Fire / Fuel:
- Electrical:
- Hazardous materials:
- Biological risks:

3. Coordination

- Police:
- Rescue:
- Medical:
- Airport authority:

4. Remarks

FORM 3 — Initial Site Survey and Evidence Preservation

Group Leader:

Date/Time:

Site Survey

- Impact point:
- Debris field:
- Wreckage distribution:
- Terrain:

2. Evidence Preservation

- Flight recorders secured:
- Perishable evidence recorded:
- Marking/tagging completed:

3. Photography / Video

- General site:
- Key components:
- Ground scars / fire:

4. Remarks

FORM 4 — Documents and Records Collection

Documentation Lead:

Date/Time:

Operator Documents

- Flight plan:
- Load sheet / manifest:
- Crew records:
- SOPs / manuals:
- Maintenance records:

2. ATS / Airport

- ATC recordings:
- Radar data:
- NOTAMs:
- Logs

3. Weather

- Forecasts:
- Actual conditions:
- Briefing records:

4. Remarks

FORM 5 — Witness, Crew, and Survivor Information

Human Factors Lead: Date/Time:

1. Witnesses
    - Number identified:
    - Statements collected:
    - Credibility notes:
2. Crew
    - Interviews conducted:
    - Medical status:
    - Duty/rest history:
3. Survivors / Passengers
    - Evacuation observations:
    - Injuries:
    - Behavior:
4. Remarks

FORM 6 — Flight Recorder Recovery and Analysis

Flight Recorder Lead: Date/Time:

1. Recovery
    - CVR location/condition:
    - FDR location/condition:
2. Readout
    - Playback completed:

- Data quality:
- Synchronization:

3. Key Findings
    - Flight path:
    - Crew actions:
    - System indications:
4. Remarks

FORM 7 — Specialist Group Investigation **(Complete separate section per group)**

A. Operations
- Flight preparation:
- SOP compliance:
- Crew performance:

B. Airworthiness
- Systems:
- Structures:
- Engines:
- Maintenance history:

C. ATS / Airport
- ATC actions:
- Navigation aids:
- Airport condition:

D. Meteorology
- Weather conditions:
- Hazards:

E. Survivability
- Evacuation:

- Fire/rescue:
- Cabin condition:

F. Human Factors

- Fatigue:
- Medical:
- Behavioral factors:

Remarks

FORM 8 — Examination, Testing, and Reconstruction

Technical Lead:

Date/Time:

Components Selected

- Systems:
- Engines:
- Structures:

2. Testing

- Laboratory tests:
- Simulator / performance analysis:

3. Reconstruction

- Wreckage reconstruction:
- Flight path reconstruction:

4. Remarks

FORM 9 — Analysis and Findings

Investigator-in-Charge:

Date/Time:

1. Sequence of Events
    - Pre-flight:
    - In-flight:
    - Impact:
    - Post-impact:
2. Contributing Factors
    - Operational:
    - Technical:
    - Environmental:
    - Human:
3. Safety Issues Identified

4. Remarks

FORM 10 — Final Report and Safety Recommendations

Investigator-in-Charge:

Date/Time:

1. Summary of Occurrence
2. Findings
3. Causes / Contributing Factors
4. Safety Recommendations
5. Attachments
    - Photos
    - Maps
    - Recorder summaries
    - Witness summaries
    - Technical reports
6. Submission Status
    - Draft:
    - Final:
    - Approved: